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In this paper, we show that alternative finance (e.g. private equity, crowdfunding and ven-
ture capital) is a key source of funding for firms that are affected by natural disasters.
Using data on a large sample of US companies from 2010 to 2019, we provide robust
empirical evidence that private funding increases within 3 months after the occurrence of
a natural disaster. Panel data analysis at state level shows that extreme events cause at
least an average increase of funding from alternative finance by 47% relative to firms in
non-affected states. We also find that size, reliance on physical assets and age improve
access to alternative finance after adverse natural events. Our empirical evidence high-
lights the key role of private lenders in providing financial resources to affected firms after
extreme exogenous events.
Introduction
Natural disasters present a broad range of eco-
nomic, environmental, financial, human and so-
cial impacts, with potentially long-lasting, multi-
generational effects. These sudden extreme events
harm economic growth (Cavallo et al., 2013;
Strobl, 2011) and increase uncertainty and chal-
lenges for organizations (Doern, Williams and
Vorley, 2019).
At the firm level, natural disasters result in
a greater firm demand for funds and height-
ened credit constraints. There is greater demand
for funds intended to restore damages caused
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by natural disasters, maintain business continuity,
secure liquidity positions and develop new op-
portunities (Barth, Sun and Zhang, 2019; Brown,
Gustafson and Ivanov, 2020; Koetter, Noth and
Rehbein, 2020). Greater credit constraints occur
because traditional sources of finance (especially
bank loans) may not be available, since extreme
natural events increase acute physical risks, which
lead to a deterioration in firms’ creditworthiness
and ability to borrow from banks. Specifically, nat-
ural disasters result in physical asset disruption,
which reduces the value of the collateral andweak-
ens a firm’s capability to obtain financing through
mainstream sources.1 This mechanism is well ex-
emplified in the case of bank lending. Firms must
make new investments to restore damaged physi-
cal assets, and thus banks register a sharp increase
in new loan requests. At the same time, banks
face a contemporary surge of deposit withdrawals,
as affected individuals and firms must make up
for the economic damage and an increase in their
current expenses (Brei, Mohan and Strobl, 2019).
Consequently, banks may have to draw on liquid
1In this paper, we refer to mainstream finance or tradi-
tional lending as financing obtained through banks and
other financial intermediaries and markets, such as insur-
ance companies and capital markets.
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assets and reduce lending in severely affected re-
gions (Nguyen and Wilson, 2020).
A growing number of papers (Chavaz, 2016;
Choudhary and Jain, 2017; Cortés and Strahan,
2017; Nguyen and Wilson, 2020; Schüwer, Lam-
bert and Noth, 2019) have investigated whether
bank lending increases or decreases after a natu-
ral disaster, reaching mixed evidence. The focus of
all these papers is on bank lending reaction after
natural disasters, but there is scant evidence of the
ability of firms to raise funds after natural disas-
ters through channels other than the traditional fi-
nancial system, such as banks and capital markets,
that do not rely on collateral to make financing de-
cisions.
We fill this gap by answering the following ques-
tion: do firms increase their funding from al-
ternative funding sources after a natural disas-
ter? Our paper addresses this question by show-
ing whether funds provided by alternative funding
sources (henceforth labelled ‘alternative finance’2)
increase after a natural disaster. This is an essen-
tial issue, given that extreme natural events en-
gender the business continuity (and sometimes the
survival) of affected firms and alternative finance
sources may be the only available option. The fact
that a natural disaster is an exogenous shock pro-
vides us with a quasi-natural experiment setting
that enables us to compare changes in funds col-
lected from alternative finance channels for com-
panies that are ‘treated’ by a natural disaster (i.e.
their physical assets have been damaged, which
undermines their ability to provide collateral in
traditional lending) and companies that are ‘non-
treated’ by natural disasters (i.e. counterfactual ev-
idence).We provide empirical evidence (both at the
state and firm level) that natural disasters cause an
increase in the amount raised through alternative
funding within 3 months after the event, focusing
on the United States between 2010 and 2019. Since
extreme weather events have a differential impact
depending on firm heterogeneity, we next investi-
gate the role of firm characteristics and deal type
2Alternative finance is intended here as all financial chan-
nels that have emerged outside of the traditional finance
system, such as regulated banks and capital markets. Al-
ternative finance activities include investments by private
firms including angels (wealthy individuals), venture cap-
ital, private equity, crowdfunding and other forms of fin-
tech (Allen, Gu and Jagtiani, 2021; Farag and Johan,
2021).
in the provisioning of alternative finance after nat-
ural disasters. We show that financing through al-
ternative sources after natural disasters increases
for large-sized firms, firms relying on physical as-
sets and start-up firms. Moreover, we provide evi-
dence that debt financing is the preferred choice of
firms in raising funds, whereas early-stage financ-
ing is negatively affected in the aftermath of an ex-
treme weather event.
Our work contributes to two different strands
of the literature. First, we contribute to the en-
trepreneurial finance literature (Cumming et al.,
2019; Wood and Wright, 2009) by shedding light
on the provisioning of funds by investors af-
ter the occurrence of a natural disaster. Previ-
ous papers involved in crisis response manage-
ment have examined either the responses of firms
to natural disasters via business continuity man-
agement, including risk and disaster management
(Herbane, Elliott and Swartz, 2010), or the cor-
porate philanthropic responses to natural disas-
ters and their subsequent reputational and finan-
cial benefits (Muller and Whiteman, 2009; Tilc-
sik and Marquis, 2013). However, little is known
about whether firms hit by extreme weather events
obtain more funds from alternative sources. Thus,
our paper fills this void by providing novel empiri-
cal evidence on which firms increase their reliance
on alternative finance at catastrophic times when
they most need funds.
Second, we contribute to the literature that in-
vestigates firms’ access to finance in the after-
math of crises (Doern,Williams and Vorley, 2019).
Previous studies focused on traditional sources
of funding, such as banks (Cortes and Strahan,
2017), insurance companies (Collier et al., 2020;
MacLaren et al., 2017), grants (Gallagher, Hart-
ley and Rohlin, 2020), trade credit (Casey and
O’Toole, 2014), business loans (De Mel, McKen-
zie and Woodruff, 2013) and government trans-
fers (Gallagher, Hartley and Rohlin, 2020). How-
ever, there is insufficient information regarding
the role of private investors (alternative finance)
on financing the recovery of firms after a catas-
trophic event. The empirical evidence suggests that
in the aftermath of financial crises, alternative fi-
nance channels are a viable and elective source
of funding, especially for small and medium-sized
enterprises (Ardic, Mylenko and Saltane, 2011;
Casey and O’Toole, 2014) and start-ups (Zhang
et al., 2015). Nevertheless, evidence is limited on
the ability of firms to raise funds from alternative
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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financial sources after extreme weather events.
Noteworthily, natural disasters are distinct sources
of uncertainty compared with an economic reces-
sion, financial crises, political instability or terror-
ism (Doern, Williams and Vorley, 2019). Although
all these events are exogenous and negatively im-
pact the financial and economic stability of firms,
natural disasters also engender physical destruc-
tion that may cause a reduction in the value of col-
lateral, which limits a firm’s ability to borrow from
traditional lenders. In this regard, our paper pro-
vides novel empirical evidence that firms’ ability
to provide collateral to obtain funding from tradi-
tional sources is reduced after this kind of extreme
event, thus firms increase their reliance on alterna-
tive finance.
Our results have important implications sug-
gesting that alternative (non-traditional) sources
of funding play a crucial role in both the survival
and prosperity prospects of firms, as well as in the
recovery of the economic regions affected by ex-
treme unanticipated disruptions. Our findings sup-
port the view that alternative finance channels can
meet firms’ increased demand for credit after an
extreme event, being a valuable remedy for the af-
fected economies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as fol-
lows. In the next section, the key contributions to
the literature on entrepreneurial finance and nat-
ural disasters are introduced and our research hy-
potheses are developed. The data are described in
the third section, and the empirical model is pre-
sented in the fourth section. In the fifth section, the
econometric results are reported and discussed; the
sixth section concludes.
Literature review and research
hypotheses
Natural catastrophes lead to an increase in loan re-
quests to replace or repair damaged assets and a
contemporary surge of deposit withdrawals, as af-
fected individuals and firms must make up for the
economic damage and increased current expenses
(Brei, Mohan and Strobl, 2019). A growing liter-
ature analyses whether bank lending increases or
decreases after a natural disaster, reaching mixed
evidence. One view is that banks decrease credit
supplied to affected areas and increase their hold-
ings of government securities (Choudhary and
Jain, 2017; Nguyen and Wilson, 2020; Schüwer,
Lambert and Noth, 2019). The decline in bank
lending results from a decline in the value of the
collateral and the economic prospects of borrow-
ers (both households and firms) in affected areas:
new firms’ loan applications are more likely to be
rejected, and existing loans are likely to go un-
paid, exposing bank balance sheets to unexpected
losses and reducing the capacity of banks to trans-
form risk. Banks may also suffer from a reduc-
tion in capital and deposits, which decreases the
funds available for lending. By contrast, a few pa-
pers (Chavaz, 2016; Cortés and Strahan, 2017) sug-
gest that banks increase lending in areas affected
by natural disasters. Banks mitigate the impact of
shocks by cutting lending most where their com-
parative advantage is least (i.e. where competing
banks have similar access to information). For in-
stance, banks increase lending in affected areas by
decreasing financing in non-affected areas (Ivanov,
Macchiavelli and Santos, 2020), or where banks
do not have branches (Cortés and Strahan, 2017).
Furthermore, few papers analyse the effect of ex-
treme weather events on funding sources other
than bank lending, such as insurance companies
(Collier et al., 2020; MacLaren et al., 2017), grants
(Gallagher, Hartley andRohlin, 2020), trade credit
(Casey and O’Toole, 2014), business loans (De
Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, 2013) and gov-
ernment transfers (Gallagher, Hartley and Rohlin,
2020). Overall, the extant evidence analyses the
effect of natural disasters on traditional funding
sources and, to the best of our knowledge, no pa-
pers are dealing with the role played by alterna-
tive finance channels. This is surprising given that
alternative finance investments (e.g. crowdfund-
ing, venture capital and angels) do not take into
great account collateral in their lending decisions.
Therefore, we argue that alternative finance fund-
ing may represent an additional source of lending
at times of heightened uncertainty due to catas-
trophic events. Hence, our main research hypothe-
sis is the following:
H1: After a natural disaster, firms increase the
amount of funds collected through alterna-
tive finance sources.
This research hypothesis is also motivated by
looking at the strand of literature that analyses the
reaction of private funds to the global financial
crisis (GFC). The few existing papers show that
in the aftermath of the GFC, alternative finance
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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channels are a viable and elective source of fund-
ing, especially for small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) (Ardic, Mylenko and Saltane, 2011;
Casey and O’Toole, 2014) and start-ups (Zhang
et al., 2015). Although systemic financial crises and
natural disasters are similar external shocks result-
ing in somehow similar effects (i.e. both are ex-
ogenous shocks for firms generating uncertainty
and making it more difficult to raise funds both
from traditional and alternative finance sources),
a natural disaster has an additional and unique
impact on firms: it generates physical destruction
that causes a reduction in the value of collateral,
which in turn limits firms’ ability to borrow from
traditional lenders but not from alternative finance
sources. This difference makes a compelling case
for the contribution of this study, highlighting the
importance of testing our main research hypothe-
sis H1.
To further explore the impact of extreme events
on the availability of funding via alternative fi-
nance sources, we rely on the entrepreneurial fi-
nance literature (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Myers,
2003; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995, among oth-
ers), suggesting that firm size, physical capital in-
tensity and age are essential factors affecting the
ability of a firm to access finance. Firm size may
enable access to disaster loans (among othermech-
anisms), which would help impacted firms to cope
with the negative effects of such unexpected events
(Doern, Williams and Vorley, 2019; Grube and
Storr, 2018; Linnenluecke and McKnight, 2017;
Monllor and Murphy, 2017; Williams and Shep-
herd, 2016). Large firms are more likely to have
insurance in high-risk areas (Neumayer, Plumper
and Barthel, 2014), which allows them to replace
destroyed physical assets, often because business
records that are required (for small firms) to access
federal aid are lost in the floods and in the destruc-
tion of their buildings (Runyan, 2006). Heightened
uncertainty during a crisis may also disproportion-
ately affect SMEs. For instance, in the post-natural
disaster period, smaller firms may be unable to se-
cure loans with collateral and face higher inter-
est rates (Collier et al., 2020). Additionally, larger
firmsmay be better placed to receive external fund-
ing as they are well known to investors (e.g. to pri-
vate equity funds, as noted by Wilson, Amini and
Wright, 2020), generatemore geographically diver-
sified cash flows and are less opaque since financial
information is easily available and often reliable
(Brown, Gustafson and Ivanov, 2020; Demirguc-
Kunt, Peria and Tressel, 2020). However, there is
no prior evidence in the literature on whether firm
size matters for access to alternative finance in
the aftermath of a catastrophic event. Thus, we
posit:
H2: Larger firms are better placed to collect funds
from alternative financial sources after a nat-
ural disaster.
Another essential determinant of a firm’s ac-
cess to finance is the availability of physical as-
sets that could be used as collateral (Barro, 1976;
Hart and Moore, 1994; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
Thus, capital-intensive industrial sectors (i.e. with
larger investments in physical capital) may bemore
prone to get bank financing by pledging fixed as-
sets. Nevertheless, once these firms are affected by
a natural disaster, their ability to provide collat-
eral on bank loans is reduced (Gan, 2007). In this
line, empirical evidence shows that in the aftermath
of a hazard event, banks seem to have expanded
credit in categories associated with non-land col-
lateral requirements (Koetter, Noth and Rehbein,
2020). Once again, these papers consider the im-
pact of collateral on firm credit from mainstream
funding sources, whereas there is no evidence on
the role of collateral in a firm’s access to alterna-
tive finance. By considering that physical asset us-
age differs across industries (e.g. IT firms rely less
on physical assets than other industries), we test
the following hypothesis:
H3: Firms in physical capital-intensive industries
are more affected by natural disasters and
thus increase their alternative finance collec-
tion.
Finally, various papers in the entrepreneurial
finance literature suggest that firm age plays an
essential role in a firm’s access to credit. Firms
with a long track record are likely to be less fi-
nancially constrained than younger firms, which
are still in the process of building a relationship
with their lenders (Berlin and Mester, 1999; Boot,
2000; Rajan, 1992). Companies well known to in-
vestors may be better placed in obtaining finance
in the aftermath of a natural disaster (Berg and
Schrader, 2012). Moreover, much of the value of
young innovative firms derives from intangible in-
vestment, thus increasing information asymme-
tries between founders and financiers and increas-
ing the potential for credit rationing. Therefore,
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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alternative finance can be more prominent for
young firms as contracts can be structured to over-
come these information asymmetries (Winton and
Yerramilli, 2008). Furthermore, once young firms
are affected by an adverse natural event, the ex-
ogenous increase in uncertainty prods these firms
to seek funds from alternative finance sources; for
example, leveraging on business similarity to mit-
igate problems associated with lack of knowledge
of the investment (Shuwaikh and Hughes, 2020).
The existing literature has not previously explored
the access to finance of early-stage firms in the af-
termath of extreme weather events. This leads us
to develop and test a further hypothesis:
H4: Start-up firms increase fund collection from
alternative finance after a natural disaster.
Lastly, yet importantly, the type of deal is
another vital determinant of a firm’s access to
credit. Information asymmetries between owners
and providers of finance affect the firm’s choice of
funding. To minimize costs associated with infor-
mation asymmetry, pecking-order theory suggests
that firms use retained earnings in preference to
debt, and new equity is issued only as a last re-
sort (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Generally, firms
prefer sources of finance associated with the low-
est level of information asymmetry. For example,
Agrawal, Catalini and Goldfarb (2011) and Ahlers
et al. (2015) argued that for equity crowdfunding,
the lack of information is severe because gather-
ing and assessing information from a distance (i.e.
a web platform) is expensive. We fill in this crucial
gap by investigating the following hypothesis:
H5: There is a positive relationship between the
occurrence of a natural hazard and the in-
crease in the amount of debt financing.
Data
We collect data on almost all funding raised by pri-
vate firms using a wide range of products (e.g. eq-
uity crowdfunding and initial coin offering) and
from various investors (e.g. family investment of-
fice and fund of funds). We gather information
for approximately 39,000 US enterprises from the
Crunchbase database from 2010 to 2019. Our
dataset includes information on the total amount
raised in each round by a firm and information on
the investors (i.e. venture capital firms and angels)
who provide the credit for the funding rounds.
Data on natural disasters are retrieved from
the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT)main-
tained by the Centre for Research on the Epi-
demiology of Disasters (CRED) of the Univer-
sité Catholique de Louvain. We focus on large-
scale disasters in the United States between 2010
and 2019, as in the case of extreme weather events.
We identify a natural event with economic losses
exceeding USD 1 billion as extreme.3 Economic
and financial losses can either be insured, lead-
ing to losses for insurance companies, or unin-
sured, which means that losses are directly borne
by financial institutions, enterprises and/or house-
holds. As an example, we analyse the following
disasters: three disasters in the United States dur-
ing the third quarter of 2017 – Hurricane Harvey
(between 25/08/17 and 29/08/17), Hurricane Irma
(between 10/09/2017 and 28/09/2017) and wildfires
in California (between 08/10/17 and 20/10/2017).
These events hit several US states, generating over-
all damages of USD 165 billion and affecting over
660,000 people. Figure 1 illustrates the total num-
ber of natural events by each US state between
2010 and 2019.
We construct two dummy variables to record the
occurrence of a natural disaster event in a state.
The first variable is at the state level (Affected ×
Post−Treatments), taking the value 1 if a state has
been hit by a natural disaster in a given month
and the two subsequent months, and 0 otherwise.
The second variable is at the firm level (Affected ×
Post−Treatmenti), taking the value 1 if a firm
is in a state hit by a natural disaster in a given
month and the two subsequent months, and 0 oth-
erwise.4 Overall, we consider a 3-month time pe-
riod to measure the post-disaster effect as done in
previous studies (e.g. Garmaise and Moskowitz,
2009; Runyan, 2006). Table 1 reports the number
of deals and amount of funds raised by type of
3Considering large events is part of our empirical strat-
egy, as we are interested in situations where borrowers
must change their normal course of action. Specifically, if
for example losses are contained and do not affect a bor-
rower’s creditworthiness or borrowing prospects, we will
be unable to test the hypotheses reported.
4We construct the dummy variable for natural disaster
considering 3 months to account for the protracted effect
of a natural event on the private funding market. Results
are qualitatively the same if we consider just the month
when a natural disaster occurs.
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Figure 1. Total number of extreme natural events by US state (2010–2019)
This figure reports the number of natural disasters that generated economic losses exceeding USD 1 billion between 2010 and 2019. For
each state, we compute the total number of events that occurred between 2010 and 2019. We then assign the states to each quartile of the
distribution of the total events. The states highlighted in dark blue are in the first quartile of the distribution of the total number of natural
disasters (between 1 and 7 events); those highlighted in light blue are in the second quartile of the distribution (between 8 and 13 events);
those highlighted in light red are in the third quartile of the distribution (between 14 and 18 events); and those highlighted in dark red are
in the fourth quartile of the distribution (between 19 and 24 events).
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Table 1. Number of deals and amount of funds raised (USD million) by type of investment
Before a natural disaster After a natural disaster
Funding type No. rounds $ millions Average No. rounds $ millions Average
Angel 1,569 1,505 0.96 545 504 0.93
Convertible note 1,354 3,060 2.26 513 2,770 5.40
Corporate round 145 18,889 130.27 58 16,765 289.06
Debt financing 3,784 91,863 24.28 1,420 40,502 28.52
Equity crowdfunding 425 575 1.35 198 224 1.13
Grant 1,947 8,998 4.62 583 2,548 4.37
Initial coin offering (ICO) 56 2,053 36.67 48 723 15.07
Non-equity assistance 49 138 2.81 10 14 1.39
Post-IPO debt 304 53,560 176.18 113 28,820 255.04
Post-IPO equity 1,057 50,948 48.20 389 30,056 77.26
Post-IPO secondary 4 2,701 675.30 2 3,100 1,550.00
Pre-seed 1,239 588 0.47 425 248 0.58
Private equity 689 83,163 120.70 264 33,808 128.06
Product crowdfunding 221 404 1.83 82 100 1.22
Secondary market 44 6,423 145.97 16 8,966 560.37
Seed 13,429 18,212 1.36 4,994 6,944 1.39
Series A and Series B 10,162 139,168 13.69 3,739 50,998 13.64
Other funding 14,260 247,833 17.38 5,298 101,246 19.11
51,237 739,000 14.42 18,697 328,336 17.56
This table reports the number of deals, the amount (in USD million) and the average amount per deal (in USD million) by funding
type for deals that occurred before a natural disaster and within 3 months after a disaster. The definition of each funding type appears
in Appendix A.
investment. The largest number of deals is for
later stage and more established companies (cat-
egory labelled ‘Other funding’ in Table 1). The
largest average size per funding round is in post-
IPO secondary deals (USD 2.7 billion), when an
investor purchases shares of stock in a company
from other, existing shareholders, whereas the low-
est average amount of funds raised is in the pre-
institutional seed rounds (USD 0.47 million).
We also collect a wide range of macroeconomic
data at the state level. State GDP growth rate
(GDP growth) accounts for the overall economic
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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development. Home price indexes (House Prices)
capture decreases in the price of real assets that
may impact the capacity of borrowers to raise
funds. The amount of loans and leases provided
by commercial banks (Bank Loans & Leases) ac-
counts for the eventual competition generated
by traditional banks on private funding markets.
Data on macroeconomic variables are collected
from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis (Federal Re-
serve Economic Data, FRED). Table 2 defines all
the variables that we use in our study.
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for our
sample. We consider approximately 70,000 fund-
ing rounds over the period 2010–2019. Approxi-
mately 21% of the total funding rounds are related
to firms that raise funding just once (denoted as
Fund_new in Table 2). Panel A describes firm-level
data, whereas Panel B summarizes state-level data.
Approximately 80% of the firms in our sample are
small in size, whereas the remaining are mostly
medium and some large. Half of the firms in our
sample belong to IT-related industries, whereas ap-
proximately 36% of all firms are start-ups.
Methodology
To test whether funding provided by private in-
vestors is affected by a natural disaster, we run
our analyses at two levels: first, we use a panel
data sample at the state level, running a standard
difference-in-differences (DiD) approach; second,
we use pooled cross-sectional data (as in Hosono
et al., 2016; Schüwer, Lambert and Noth, 2019)
to investigate the mediating role of the borrowers’
characteristics accessing alternative finance after
adverse natural events.
We first use the following DiD approach to es-
timate at the state level the aggregate effect of a
natural disaster on the affected states. The specifi-
cation is as follows:
Amount Raiseds,t =
β1 (Affected × Post−Disaster)s
+ β2GDP growths,t + β3House Pricess,t
+ β4BankLoanss,t + αs + αt + εs,t (1)
where the dependent variable is the log volume
of private funding raised by firms in state s (e.g.
California) in month t (e.g. January). The treat-
ment group is identified by the variable Affected
× Post-Disasteri, i.e. a dummy variable capturing
the occurrence of a natural disaster at the state
level within 3 months after the natural disaster.
The coefficient of main interest is β1, as it en-
ables us to test our first research hypothesis H1.
Since natural disasters are exogenous shocks, our
estimations do not suffer from endogeneity prob-
lems, and the coefficient β1 estimates the causal
average treatment effect (ATE) of natural disas-
ters on the amount raised by alternative finance
sources. The control group includes (a) all states
that have not been affected by natural disasters at
the time inwhich disasters affected other states and
(b) all US states (both affected and non-affected)
before the occurrence of natural disasters. At the
state level, we control for various macroeconomic
factors that may influence firms’ funding ability,
such as economic growth (measured by quarterly
GDP growth – GDP growth), the value of prop-
erties (measured by the house price index – House
Prices) and the size of the banking system (mea-
sured by the overall amount of commercial bank
loans granted – Bank Loans). We take the natural
logarithm of all the variables (except the dummy
variable Affected × Post-Disaster) included in the
estimations to limit problems associated with ex-
treme values.We includemonth fixed effects (αt) to
capture time trends, and state fixed effects (αs) to
gauge unobservable state traits. Hence, we do not
include in our model a dummy for a state treated
by a natural disaster (Affected) and a time dummy
for capturing the treatment (Post-Disaster) since
these are absorbed by the state and month fixed
effects. The coefficient of main interest is β1, cap-
turing the differential effect on private funding of
the occurrence of natural disasters and expressing
the average treatment effect between affected and
non-affected states.
As a second step, we focus our analysis at the
borrower level using pooled cross-sectional data to
identify the idiosyncratic effect of a natural event
on a firm source of funding. This approach allows
us to investigate heterogeneous effects depending
on firm characteristics. The specification is as fol-
lows:
Amount Raisedi,s,t =
β1 (Affected × Post−Disaster)i
+ β2GDP growths,t + β3House Pricess,t
+ β4Bank Loanss,t + αs + αt + αt∗ind + εs,t (2)
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
Alternative Finance after Natural Disasters 9
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
No. observations Mean Std dev. Min. Median Max.
Panel A: Firm-level data
All sample
Affected × Post-Disaster 69,934 0.267 0.443 0.000 0.000 1.000
Fund (in USD million) 69,934 14.669 1.872 6.488 14.626 23.273
Fund_new (in USD million) 14,686 13.999 1.982 6.488 13.864 22.690
Fund_old (in USD million) 55,248 14.848 1.800 6.908 14.845 23.273
Small firm 69,934 0.814 0.389 0.000 1.000 1.000
Medium firm 69,934 0.160 0.367 0.000 0.000 1.000
Large firm 69,934 0.025 0.157 0.000 0.000 1.000
Non-IT (restricted) 30,254 0.378 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000
Non-IT (whole) 69,934 0.164 0.370 0.000 0.000 1.000
Start-up 69,934 0.365 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000
Small firms
Affected × Post-Disaster 56,935 0.268 0.443 0.000 0.000 1.000
Fund (in USD million) 56,935 14.295 1.691 6.488 14.310 21.947
Fund_new (in USD million) 13,318 13.772 1.808 6.488 13.816 21.947
Fund_old (in USD million) 43,617 14.454 1.620 6.908 14.509 21.128
Medium firms
Affected × Post-Disaster 11,220 0.269 0.443 0.000 0.000 1.000
Fund (in USD million) 11,220 16.210 1.627 8.923 16.330 22.690
Fund_new (in USD million) 984 15.958 2.057 8.923 16.154 22.690
Fund_old (in USD million) 10,236 16.234 1.578 9.394 16.341 21.679
Large firms
Affected × Post-Disaster 1,779 0.240 0.427 0.000 0.000 1.000
Fund (in USD million) 1,779 16.960 2.181 9.210 16.951 23.273
Fund_new (in USD million) 384 16.858 2.502 9.210 16.811 21.976
Fund_old (in USD million) 1,395 16.988 2.084 10.127 16.998 23.273
Non-IT = 1
Affected × Post-Disaster 11,445 0.274 0.446 0.000 0.000 1.000
Fund (in USD million) 11,445 14.593 1.949 6.908 14.509 22.595
Fund_new (in USD million) 2,774 14.023 2.125 6.908 13.816 21.976
Fund_old (in $ million) 8,671 14.775 1.853 7.601 14.732 22.595
Start-up = 1
Affected × Post-Disaster 25,553 0.275 0.446 0.000 0.000 1.000
Fund (in USD million) 25,553 13.918 1.679 6.908 13.911 22.690
Fund_new (in USD million) 7,227 13.574 1.748 6.908 13.528 22.690
Fund_old (in USD million) 18,326 14.054 1.631 6.908 14.039 20.918
Panel B: State-level data
Affected × Post-Disaster 5,590 0.164 0.370 0.000 0.000 1.000
Fund (in USD million) 5,590 196.041 824.682 0.000 12.226 21,911.000
Fund_new (in USD million) 5,590 36.151 169.656 0.000 0.500 3,504.110
Fund_old (in USD million) 5,590 159.890 757.824 0.000 7.788 21,794.130
GDP growth (in percentage points) 5,590 0.150 0.006 0.000 0.000 8.532
House prices 5,590 367.732 122.620 182.560 336.200 950.750
Loan leases (in USD billion) 5,590 148.000 297.000 0.633 39.900 1,670.000
This table reports the summary statistics for the two samples we use in the paper (i.e. firm-level data in Panel A and state-level data in
Panel B) for the period 2010–2019. All variables are described in Table 2.
Source of data: Crunchbase and FRED.
where the dependent variable is the volume of pri-
vate funding raised by firm i in a funding round in
month t. Affected × Post-Disasteri is the dummy
variable capturing the effect of natural disaster for
firms in a state affected in comparison with non-
affected firms, and the coefficient of main inter-
est is β1 as it enables us to test our first research
hypothesis (H1). We run three different specifica-
tions to capture the effects of state, time and in-
dustry time-invariant unobservable factors. First,
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we include state fixed effects (αs), then year fixed ef-
fects (αt) and, in the last specification, we also satu-
rate our model with (industry × year) fixed effects
(αt∗ind). Since we used a pooled cross-sectional
dataset,5 our model is not a DiDmodel, but a sim-
ple difference model. However, natural disasters
are exogenous shocks; therefore, our estimations
do not suffer from endogeneity problems, and the
coefficient β1 estimates the causal ATE of natu-
ral disasters on the amount raised by alternative fi-
nance sources. As per Eq. (1), we take all variables
(except the dummy Affected × Post−Treatmenti)
in natural logarithm.
As a third step, we introduce the role of bor-
rower characteristics that may influence the abil-
ity to collect funds through alternative finance
sources. Following our discussion in the literature
review, we rely on the entrepreneurial finance liter-
ature, suggesting that firm size, physical capital in-
tensity and age are essential factors that affect the
ability of a firm to access finance. To this purpose,
we extend Eq. (2) by introducing specific dummy
variables to account for firm heterogeneity for each
of these corporate features (firm size, physical cap-
ital intensity and age) as follows:
Amount Raisedi,s,t =
β1 (Affected × Post−Disaster)i
+ β2Firm Dummyi + β3 (Affected × Post
− Disaster × Firm Dummy)i
+ β4GDP growths,t + β5House Pricess,t
+ β6 Bank Loanss,t + αs + αt + αt∗ind + εs,t (3)
where all variables are the same as in Eq. (2) and
the variable FirmDummy changes according to the
corporate dimensions investigated. Specifically, we
capture firm size using three dummy variables:
small size (taking the value 1 for companies with
less than 100 employees, and 0 otherwise);medium
size (taking the value 1 for companies with num-
ber of employees ranging between 100 and 1,000,
and 0 otherwise); and large size (taking the value
1 for companies with more than 1,000 employees,
5Only in a few cases do we have that the same firms col-
lect funds more than once. Hence, we are not able to con-
struct panel data for firms collecting funds from alterna-
tive finance sources over time and observe the behaviour
of firms affected by natural disasters before and after the
natural disaster.
and 0 otherwise). To capture firm capital inten-
sity, we generate the dummy variable non-IT tak-
ing the value 1 if firms do not belong to the IT sec-
tor.6 Similarly, we capture the firm age using the
dummy variable start-up that takes the value 1 if
the difference between the date of funding and the
firm’s foundation date is less than 30 months; and
0 otherwise. Moreover, we capture the ‘deal type’
by generating two dummy variables: debt financ-
ing (taking the value 1 if the deal is a debt financ-
ing or grant, and 0 otherwise) and seed (taking the
value 1 if the deal takes the form of angel, pre-seed
or seed financing, and 0 otherwise). The coefficient
of main interest is now β3 for the triple interaction
(Affected × Post-Disaster × Firm Dummy) i.e. the
effect of a natural disaster for firms with a given
characteristic in a state in comparison with non-
affected firms. The estimated β3 allows us to test
all remaining research hypotheses (H2–H5).
Results
We first present the results of our DiD model in
Eq. (1) using state-level data on the total amount
of funds collected by all borrowers in all funding
rounds. We run various models that are saturated
by time and state fixed effects to capture invariant
factors across states and time. In line with the stud-
ies pointing to an increase in the supply of funding
6The variable non-IT sector is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 for firms included in sectors not related to
IT. This variable is obtained as follows. (1) According to
the industry classification in the Crunchbase database, we
defined the IT-related industries as follows: Apps, Artifi-
cial Intelligence, Electronics, Data and Analytics, Gam-
ing, Hardware, Information Technology, Messaging and
Telecommunications, Mobile, Navigation and Mapping,
Platforms, Science and Engineering, and Software; all re-
maining industries are classified as not related to the IT
sector. (2) Since firms are classified in more than one in-
dustry (e.g. a firm can be classified to be in the Artificial
Intelligence,Data andAnalytics, andGaming sectors), we
create a score for each firm in the sample by counting the
number of occurrences in IT and non-IT sectors. (3) We
create the IT and non-IT dummy using two approaches:
first, we give the value 1 to the IT sector if the number
of occurrences in IT sectors is greater than the number of
occurrences in non-IT sectors; second, we run the same
approach but remove all cases if the differences between
occurrences in the two groups are 0 or 1. The second ap-
proach reduces the number of available observations from
69,934 to 30,242, but it enables us to omit all cases in
which there is no clear evidence of the main industry for
a firm.
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Table 4. Alternative finance after a natural disaster: state-level evidence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All funds collected
Affected × Post-Disaster 2.704*** 2.416*** 0.671*** 0.467**
(0.456) (0.466) (0.161) (0.176)
GDP growth 0.042 −0.187*** −0.161
(0.185) (0.062) (0.120)
House prices 1.101** 0.005 −0.288
(0.470) (0.451) (0.306)
Bank loans & leases 6.625*** 4.156*** 0.148
(1.644) (0.597) (1.154)
Observations 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590
R-squared 0.022 0.172 0.581 0.599
State FE No No Yes Yes
Time (monthly) FE No No No Yes
Panel B: Total funds collected in the first round or in following rounds
Affected × Post-Disaster 0.298 0.265 0.706*** 0.416**
(0.210) (0.262) (0.193) (0.196)
GDP growth −0.363*** −0.335** −0.134* −0.106
(0.133) (0.164) (0.078) (0.114)
House prices 0.537* −0.142 −0.393 −0.516
(0.272) (0.259) (0.514) (0.409)
Bank loans & leases 9.497*** 0.183 2.041** 0.217
(1.019) (1.573) (0.784) (1.705)
Observations 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590
R-squared 0.472 0.503 0.587 0.603
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time (monthly) FE No Yes No Yes
Collection round = 1 = 1 > 1 > 1
This table reports the results of the difference-in-differences model reported in Eq. (1). In Panel A, the dependent variable is the log
value of recipient total funds collected by all borrowers in state s. In columns 1 and 2, we report estimates running a pooled OLS
model; we include state fixed effects in column 3 and both state and time (monthly) fixed effects in column 4. In Panel B, columns 1
and 2, the dependent variable is the log value of recipient new funds (i.e. the first time a firm collects funds) collected by all borrowers
in state s. In Panel B, columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the log value of recipient funds collected by all borrowers in state s
that already collected funds in the past (i.e. funds collected after the first round). In both panels, the treatment group comprises the
US states affected by a natural disaster over 3 months (Affected × Post-Disaster). The control group is composed of (a) other US
states not affected by a natural disaster and (b) all US states (both affected and non-affected) in periods before the disaster. To remove
confounding effects, we removed all observations in the 12 months before the natural disaster for all the affected states [we would like to
thank our discussant at the conference on ‘Entrepreneurial Finance in Honour of Mike Wright’ for providing us with this suggestion].
We control for various macroeconomic factors (log-transformed) at the state level that may affect the amount of funds collected in the
state: GDP growth, house prices and the overall amount of loans granted by commercial banks. All variables are defined in Table 2.
The sample period is 2010–2019. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Source of data: FRED and Crunchbase.
following natural disasters (Cortes and Strahan,
2017; Koetter, Noth and Rehbein, 2020), we show
that the overall amount of funds raised through
alternative finance sources by firms in states af-
fected by a natural disaster is greater than that
by firms in non-affected states (Table 4, Panel A).
This result is consistent across specifications. Since
natural disasters are exogenous shocks, our iden-
tification strategy is based on a DiD approach
and our estimations do not suffer from endogene-
ity problems. Therefore, the coefficient β1 (for the
double interaction term Affected × Post-Disaster)
shows the causal ATE of natural disasters on the
amount raised by alternative finance sources. Fo-
cusing on the specification that includes both state
and time fixed effects (Table 4, Panel A, column 4),
we show that the overall amount of funds raised
through alternative finance sources by firms in
states affected by a natural disaster (in the follow-
ing 3 months) is 47% greater than that by firms in
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non-affected states, providing clear support for our
first research hypothesis (H1). Conversely, we do
not find a similar effect for the overall amount
of funds raised through the banking channel. As
shown in Appendix Table B1, bank loans and
leases collected by firms in affected and non-
affected states do not display a statistically signif-
icant difference. Turning to macroeconomic fac-
tors, we report positive statistically significant es-
timates for the overall amount of loans granted by
commercial banks, except for the specificationwith
both time and state fixed effects. In general, the em-
pirical evidence provided in this table confirms our
main hypothesis that alternative financing sources
such as private equity, crowdfunding and venture
capital increase for affected states after a natural
disaster due to the credit constraints imposed by
the conventional funding sources.
In Table 4, Panel B we differentiate our anal-
ysis according to the funding round. Specifically,
in the first two columns, we consider only those
firms that borrowed money just once, controlling
for state fixed effects (in column 1) and for both
state and time fixed effects (in column 2). As ex-
plained above, information asymmetries are lower
for known borrowers, in terms of facilitating firms’
access to finance after an exogenous shock (Berg
and Schrader, 2012). Conversely, in the last two
columns, we consider those borrowers that have
collected funds from alternative finance more than
once. We report a positive statistically significant
effect only for those firms that have previous expe-
rience in collecting funds through alternative chan-
nels. This increases the confidence of the investor
(Capizzi, Croce and Tenca, 2020 and references
cited therein) and thus facilitates the funding pro-
cess in turbulent times, such as the aftermath of
a natural disaster. Regarding the control variables,
it appears that when the state of the economy is
good, there is a reduction in the amount collected
by firms participating for the first time in an alter-
native finance funding round. Finally, firms collect
funds from alternative finance sources regardless
of their previous experience in this type of fund-
ing, in periods when banks increase their supply
of credit.
Next, we shift our focus to the firm level. In Ta-
ble 5, Panel A we show that the coefficient of main
interest (Affected × Post-Disaster) is positive and
statistically significant in all regressions, showing
that the amount of credit provided through non-
traditional lenders is higher for firms in affected
states within 3 months after the occurrence of a
natural disaster. Our results strongly support our
first research hypothesis (H1), suggesting that haz-
ardous exogenous events (damaging severely the
properties that can be used as collateral by firms
that seek external funds by lowering their values)
can negatively impact the credit lines from main-
stream financial institutions such as banks, prod-
ding firms to collect funds from alternative finance
sources. This finding is also confirmed when we
include firm fixed effects (Table 5, Panel A, col-
umn 5).7 Concerning the macroeconomic factors,
in most of the specifications, we observe a posi-
tive strong statistical relationship for bank loans
in line with the view that banks react by increas-
ing lending in the aftermath of a natural disas-
ter (Chavaz, 2016; Cortés and Strahan, 2017). This
suggests that it is easier for a firm to collect funds
by alternative finance channels when the value of
properties is higher and bank competition is high.
As before, we account for the different number
of funding rounds a firm participated in. The re-
sults presented in Panel B of Table 5 demonstrate
that the firms that have been affected by a natu-
ral disaster can raise funds from non-mainstream
sources of credit, regardless of how many fund-
ing rounds they participated in at one time, albeit
the statistical significance is lower in the case of
firms with experience in raising alternative funds.
Nevertheless, we note that lower economic condi-
tions trigger an increase in borrowed funds only
for firms with experience in raising alternative fi-
nance. Thus, it seems that the importance of al-
ternative finance channels for firms increases when
the economic growth is subdued; this is not sur-
prising, since fund collection from standard chan-
nels (such as the banking one) is usually cyclical
and thus declines when economic growth declines.
We now turn our attention to the borrower char-
acteristics that may influence the ability to col-
lect funds through alternative finance sources. To
further explore the impact of extreme events on
the availability of funding via alternative finance
sources, we investigate how heterogeneity in firm
size, physical capital intensity and age affects the
ability of a firm to raise alternative funding.
First, we focus on the size of the enterprise.
Specifically, we estimate Eq. (3), where the firm
7To include firm fixed effects, we exclude firms that have
raised funds only once. Consequently, the total number of
observations in column 5 is lower.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
Alternative Finance after Natural Disasters 13
Table 5. Alternative finance after a natural disaster: firm-level evidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All funds collected
Affected × Post-Disaster 0.029* 0.033** 0.036** 0.034** 0.024*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
GDP growth −0.010 −0.017** −0.015** −0.022***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
House prices 0.307*** −0.010 0.085 1.366***
(0.071) (0.113) (0.113) (0.158)
Bank loans & leases 0.265*** 0.224*** 0.210*** 0.318***
(0.043) (0.049) (0.048) (0.073)
Observations 69,934 69,934 69,934 69,934 46,793
Firms (#) 39,107 39,107 39,107 39,107 39,107
R-squared 0.048 0.052 0.106 0.118 0.794
Firm FE No No No No Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Industry FE No No Yes No No
Year FE No No Yes No No
Year × Industry FE No No No Yes Yes
Std error Robust Robust Robust Robust Cluster
Panel B: Total funds collected in the first round or in following rounds
Affected × Post-Disaster 0.065* 0.061* 0.029* 0.028
(0.037) (0.037) (0.017) (0.017)
GDP growth −0.006 −0.004 −0.023*** −0.022***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.008) (0.008)
House prices −0.248 −0.186 0.068 0.163
(0.254) (0.255) (0.152) (0.151)
Bank loans & leases −0.022 −0.021 0.342*** 0.335***
(0.080) (0.078) (0.073) (0.074)
Observations 14,670 14,670 55,245 55,245
Firms # 14,670 14,670 24,421 24,421
R-squared 0.113 0.143 0.105 0.118
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes No Yes No
Year × Industry FE No Yes No Yes
Std error Robust Robust Cluster firm Cluster firm
Collection round = 1 = 1 > 1 > 1
This table reports the results of the model in Eq. (2). In Panel A, the dependent variable is the log value of recipient total funds collected
by firm i. In Panel B, the dependent variable is either the log value of the recipient total funds collected by firm i in the first round or
in the following rounds. In all the specifications (except for column 5, Panel A), we report estimates obtained using the pooled cross-
sectional sample. In column 5, we report the estimates of a panel data model: in this case, the number of observations is substantially
lower since only a few firms collect fundsmore than once. Themain variable of interest is (Affected×Post-Disaster), capturing the effect
for all recipients in a US state affected by a natural disaster over 3 months after the occurrence of the disaster. This coefficient shows
the (single) difference over firms in other US states that were not affected by the natural disaster and all firms in any US states (both
affected and non-affected) in periods before the disaster occurred. We control for various macroeconomic factors (log-transformed)
at the state level that may affect the amount of funds collected in a state: GDP growth, house prices and the overall amount of loans
granted by commercial banks. The sample period is 2010–2019. All variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors (either robust or
clustered at the bank level) are reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Source of data: FRED and Crunchbase.
dummy comprises a dummy variable (labelled size)
capturing firm size (small, medium and large com-
panies). Looking at the results in Table 6, we find
that the size coefficient is positive and statistically
significant for medium and especially large-sized
firms. This is consistent with previous findings in
the entrepreneurial finance literature, which doc-
umented that large-sized firms have access to all
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Table 6. Alternative finance after a natural disaster: firm-level evidence of the role of the borrower’s size
(1) (2) (3)
Small firm Medium firm Large firm
Affected × Post-Disaster 0.074** 0.025 0.031**
(0.033) (0.016) (0.016)
Size −1.952*** 1.747*** 2.311***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.058)
Affected × Post-Disaster × Size −0.049 0.039 0.280**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.123)
GDP growth −0.017** −0.017** −0.015**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
House prices 0.244** 0.176 0.155
(0.104) (0.107) (0.111)
Bank loans & leases 0.240*** 0.237*** 0.210***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.047)
Observations 69,934 69,934 69,934
Size (# of firms) 33,788 4,401 928
R-squared 0.279 0.233 0.157
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year × Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Std error Robust Robust Robust
This table reports the results of the model in Eq. (3), where the dependent variable is the log value of recipient total funds collected by
firm i. We report estimates obtained using the full pooled cross-sectional sample, including state and industry year fixed effects. In each
regression, the variable size represents small-sized firms (column 1), medium-sized firms (column 2) or large-sized firms (column 3), as
defined in Table 2. The variables of main interest are (a) the interaction Affected × Post-Disaster, capturing the effect for all recipients
in a US state affected by a natural disaster over 3 months following the disaster and (b) the interactionAffected× Post-Disaster× Size,
capturing the effect for all recipients with a given dimension (measured by the number of employees) in a US state affected by a natural
disaster over 3 months after the disaster. We control for various macroeconomic factors (log-transformed) at the state level that may
affect the amount of funds collected in the state: GDP growth, house prices and the overall amount of loans granted by commercial
banks. The sample period is 2010–2019. All variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors are robust and reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Source of data: FRED and Crunchbase.
sorts of financing channels because of their size
and the amount of collateral that they pledge to
creditors. The coefficient of main interest is the
triple interaction (Affected×Post-Disaster× Size)
showing the effect produced by a natural disas-
ter on firms located in an affected state, distin-
guishing among firms with small size (column 1),
medium size (column 2) and large size (column 3),
in comparison with non-affected firms of a sim-
ilar size. The sign, magnitude and statistical sig-
nificance of these coefficients enable us to test our
second research hypothesis (H2). Although all af-
fected firms increase fund collection by alternative
finance sources in the aftermath of a natural dis-
aster (i.e. coefficient estimates for Affected × Post-
Disaster are positive and statistically significant),
the coefficient for the triple interaction term (Af-
fected × Post-Disaster × Size) is positive and sta-
tistically significant at the 5% confidence level only
for large-sized firms. This suggests that large com-
panies have an advantage in using alternative fi-
nance channels in comparison with non-affected
firms. Besides past papers on entrepreneurial fi-
nance documenting that large-sized firms can ac-
cess credit more easily than can smaller firms, we
now show that large companies have an advantage
using alternative finance channels, supporting our
second research hypothesis (H2). Moreover, since
the role played by collateral in lending decisions
is minor in alternative investments, we argue that
the advantage that large-sized firms possess in ac-
cessing alternative finance channels after a natural
disaster is because these firms are well known in
the market and there is a provision of reliable and
easily available information on them, rather than
the availability of physical assets to be pledged as
collateral.
Furthermore, we investigate whether firms hav-
ing physical assets to be pledged as collateral in
bank loans have a lower incentive to collect funds
using alternative finance sources both in general
and after a natural disaster (Table 7). Since the
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Table 7. Alternative finance after a natural disaster: firm-level evidence of the role of a borrower’s industry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Affected × Post-Disaster −0.000 −0.000 0.009 0.009
(0.029) (0.030) (0.021) (0.021)
Non-IT 0.041 0.037 0.097*** 0.096***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.021) (0.021)
Affected × Post-Disaster ×
Non-IT
0.105** 0.096** 0.062** 0.056*
(0.048) (0.049) (0.030) (0.031)
GDP growth −0.030*** −0.029** −0.017** −0.015**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
House prices 0.306* 0.403** −0.014 0.082
(0.177) (0.178) (0.113) (0.113)
Bank loans & leases 0.310*** 0.327*** 0.227*** 0.213***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.049) (0.048)
Observations 30,242 30,242 69,934 69,934
Firm (#) 16,743 16,743 39,107 39,107
R-squared 0.098 0.113 0.106 0.118
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No Yes No
Industry FE Yes No Yes No
Year × Industry FE No Yes No Yes
Std error Robust Robust Robust Robust
This table reports the results of the model in Eq. (3), where the dependent variable is the log value of recipient total funds collected
by firm i. We report estimates obtained using the full pooled cross-sectional sample. The variable non-IT sector is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 for firms included in sectors not related to IT. This variable is obtained as follows. (1) According to the industry
classification in the Crunchbase database, we defined the IT-related industries as follows: Apps, Artificial Intelligence, Electronics,
Data and Analytics, Gaming, Hardware, Information Technology, Messaging and Telecommunications, Mobile Phones, Navigation
andMapping, Platforms, Science andEngineering, and Software; all remaining industries are classified as not related to the IT sector. (2)
Since firms are classified in more than one industry (e.g. a firm can be classified to be in the Artificial Intelligence, Data and Analytics,
and Gaming sectors), we create a score for each firm in the sample by counting the number of occurrences in the IT and non-IT
sectors. (3) We create a non-IT dummy using two approaches: first, we give the value 1 to the IT sector if the number of occurrences
in IT sectors is greater than the number of occurrences in non-IT sectors; second, we run the same approach, but we remove all cases
if the absolute value of the differences between occurrences in the two groups is 0 or 1. The second approach reduces the number of
available observations from 69,934 to 30,242, but it enables us to omit all cases in which there is no clear evidence of the main industry
for a firm. Hence, the variable non-IT sector is computed using the restricted sample in columns 1 and 2, and the full sample in columns
3 and 4. The variables of main interest are (a) the interaction Affected × Post-Disaster, capturing the effect for all recipients in a US
state affected by a natural disaster over 3 months following the disaster and (b) the interaction Affected × Post-Disaster × Non-IT,
estimating the effect for all recipient industries different from IT in a US state affected by a natural disaster over 3 months following
the disaster. We control for various macroeconomic factors (log-transformed) at the state level that may affect the amount of funds
collected in the state: GDP growth, house prices and the overall amount of loans granted by commercial banks. The sample period is
2010–2019. All variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors are robust and reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Source of data: FRED and Crunchbase.
classification of industries relying more on phys-
ical assets may be subjective, we create a dummy
variable for all firms in IT sectors8 (where the avail-
ability of physical assets is in most cases less rele-
vant for obtaining credit) and a dummy variable
8The variable non-IT sector is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 for firms included in sectors that are not related
to IT (as described in footnote 6). The variables of main
interest are the interaction (Affected × Post-Disaster),
capturing the effect for all recipients in an affected US
state.
for firms in non-IT sectors. In Table 7, the coeffi-
cient of main interest is the triple interaction (Af-
fected × Post-Disaster × Non-IT) showing the ef-
fect produced by a natural disaster on firms non-
related to the IT industry and located in an af-
fected state in comparison with non-affected firms:
the sign, magnitude and statistical significance of
these coefficients enable us to test our third re-
search hypothesis (H3). Generally, we find that the
coefficient estimate for non-IT is not statistically
significant (at the 10% level or less) for firms whose
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 8. Alternative finance after a natural disaster: firm-level evidence of the role of a borrower’s age
(1) (2) (3)
Affected × Post-Disaster 0.034* 0.022 0.020
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Start-up −1.240*** −1.140*** −1.139***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Affected × Post-Disaster × Start-up 0.046 0.055* 0.059**
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
GDP growth −0.003 −0.011 −0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
House prices 0.183*** −0.092 0.009
(0.069) (0.108) (0.108)
Bank loans & leases 0.255*** 0.179*** 0.169***
(0.043) (0.048) (0.047)
Observations 69,934 69,934 69,934
Firm # 39,107 39,107 39,107
R-squared 0.150 0.185 0.195
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No
Year × Industry FE No No Yes
Std error Robust Robust Robust
This table reports the results of the model in Eq. (3), where the dependent variable is the log value of recipient total funds collected by
firm i. We report estimates obtained using the full pooled cross-sectional sample. The variable Start-up is a dummy taking the value 1
for all recipients with firm’s age inferior to 30 months. The main variables of interest are (a) the interaction Affected × Post-Disaster,
capturing the effect for all recipients in a US state affected by a natural disaster over 3 months following the disaster and (b) the triple
interactionAffected× Post-Disaster× Start-up capturing the effect for all start-up recipients in a US state affected by a natural disaster
over 3 months after the disaster. We control for various macroeconomic factors (log-transformed) at the state level that may affect the
amount of funds collected in the state: GDP growth, house prices and the overall amount of loans granted by commercial banks. The
sample period is 2010–2019. All variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors are robust and reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Source of data: FRED and Crunchbase.
primary business is in non-IT sectors (Table 7,
columns 1 and 2). By contrast, firms that combine
IT and non-IT businesses collect larger sums from
non-alternative finance sources (Table 7, columns
3 and 4). This suggests that businesses primar-
ily operating in non-IT sectors – usually having a
greater physical asset intensity, and thus a greater
capability to provide collateral to banks than firms
in the IT industry – raise less funding from alter-
native finance sources. Nonetheless, the coefficient
estimate for the interaction term (Affected× Post-
Disaster×Non-IT) is positive and statistically sig-
nificant at the 5% level. Additionally, the greater
magnitude of the coefficients for the interaction
term in the regressions with firms whose primary
business is non-IT (Table 7, columns 1 and 2) con-
firms our third research hypothesis (H3): once af-
fected by natural disasters that damage their prop-
erties, firms having a greater physical asset inten-
sity (the ones more exposed to disruption) are less
able to provide collateral in traditional finance (e.g.
bank loans) and thus increase their funding collec-
tion through alternative finance collection.
As a next step, we focus our attention on
firm start-ups by considering whether firm age
plays an important role in gaining access to non-
mainstream credit lines. Specifically, we define a
start-up dummy variable (i.e. start-up takes the
value 1 if the difference between the date of fund-
ing and the firm’s foundation date is less than 30
months, and 0 otherwise). In Table 8, the coeffi-
cient of main interest is the triple interaction (Af-
fected × Post-Disaster × Start-up) showing the
effect produced by a natural disaster on firms
founded less than 30 months ago and located in
an affected state in comparison with non-affected
firms: the sign, magnitude and statistical signifi-
cance of these coefficients enable us to test our
fourth research hypothesis (H4). Overall, we find
that the coefficient estimate for start-up is negative
and statistically significant (at the 1% level), sug-
gesting that companies funded less than 30months
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 9. Alternative finance after a natural disaster: firm-level evidence of the deal type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Debt financing Debt financing Seed Seed
Affected × Post-Disaster 0.025 0.022 0.235*** 0.234***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Deal type −0.559*** −0.568*** −1.368*** −1.358***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.014) (0.014)
Affected × Post-Disaster × Deal Type 0.107** 0.109** −0.662*** −0.659***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.027) (0.027)
GDP growth −0.018** −0.016** −0.012* −0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
House prices −0.015 0.082 0.115 0.187*
(0.112) (0.112) (0.104) (0.105)
Bank loans & leases 0.212*** 0.199*** 0.202*** 0.185***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046)
Observations 69,934 69,934 69,934 69,934
Firm (#) 39,107 39,107 39,107 39,107
R-squared 0.113 0.126 0.234 0.243
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No Yes No
Industry FE Yes No Yes No
Year × Industry FE No Yes No Yes
Std error Robust Robust Robust Robust
This table reports the results of the model in Eq. (3), where the dependent variable is the log value of recipient total funds collected by
firm i. We report estimates obtained using the full pooled cross-sectional OLS model sample. In each regression, the dummy variable
‘deal type’ either represents funds collected as debt funds in the form of debt financing or grant (columns 1 and 2) or seed in the form
of angel, pre-seed or seed financing (columns 3 and 4). The variables of main interest are (a) the interaction Affected × Post-Disaster,
capturing the effect for all recipients in a US state affected by a natural disaster over 3 months after the disaster and (b) the triple
interaction Affected × Post-Disaster × Deal Type, capturing the effect for all recipients of a given deal type in a US state affected by
a natural disaster over 3 months after the disaster. We control for various macroeconomic factors (log-transformed) at the state level
that may affect the amount of funds collected in the state: GDP growth, house prices and the overall amount of loans granted by
commercial banks. The sample period is 2010–2019. All variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors are robust and reported in
parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Source of data: FRED and Crunchbase.
ago, on average, collect a lower amount of funds
than more established firms. To estimate the dif-
ferential effect for start-up firms affected by natu-
ral disasters relative to non-affected firms, we fo-
cus on the coefficient estimates for the triple inter-
action term (Affected× Post-Disaster× Start-up);
this is positive and statistically significant at the 5%
level or less in the most complete specification of
Eq. (2) (columns 2 and 3 in Table 8), supporting
our fourth hypothesis (H4). Once affected by nat-
ural disasters, start-up firms increase fund collec-
tion from alternative finance channels in compari-
son with non-affected firms.
Finally, yet importantly, we consider the type of
deal of the fund collection from alternative credit
channels (Table 9). Data availability enables us to
differentiate deals into two main categories, debt
financing (columns 1 and 2) and early-stage financ-
ing (columns 3 and 4). The coefficient of main
interest is the triple interaction (Affected × Post-
Disaster×Deal Type) showing the effect produced
by a natural disaster on firms located in an af-
fected state for a given deal type (either debt fi-
nancing or seed) in comparison with non-affected
firms: the sign, magnitude and statistical signifi-
cance of these coefficients enable us to test our fifth
research hypothesis (H5). As shown in Table 9, the
coefficient estimate for Deal Type is negative and
statistically significant (at the 1% level) for both
debt financing deals and seed deals, suggesting that
both these types of deals generally collect lower
amounts of funds than other deal types. We cap-
ture the differential effect for each of these two deal
types for firms affected by natural disasters rela-
tive to non-affected firms through the coefficient
of the triple interaction term (Affected × Post-
Disaster × Deal Type). The estimates are positive
and statistically significant at the 5% level for debt
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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financing (meaning that in the aftermath of an ex-
treme event, firms collect more external financial
resources in the form of debt financing in com-
parison with non-affected firms, as shown in Ta-
ble 9, columns 1 and 2), whereas coefficient esti-
mates for seed deals are negative and statistically
significant at the 1% level (meaning that in the af-
termath of an extreme event, firms collect less ex-
ternal financial resources in the form of seeds rel-
ative to non-affected firms, as shown in Table 9,
columns 1 and 2). These results are not surpris-
ing since natural disasters negatively impact fund
collection through bank loans (disrupting physi-
cal assets that firms may provide as collateral) and
prod affected firms to seek alternative debt financ-
ing sources. Conversely, early-stage financing in-
volves raising lower amounts in general and even
lower amounts in the aftermath of a natural disas-
ter. This is because the informational asymmetries
are more severe for the financing of early-stage
ventures and firms may find it difficult or costly
to raise money as investors may be reluctant to
acquire ownership in an early-stage company (i.e.
seed type). Generally, our results support our fifth
research hypothesis (H5).
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the flow of funding
to firms after a natural disaster. We focus on non-
bank lending and analyse firm characteristics that
explain differences in the amount of funds raised
after a natural disaster. We argue that natural dis-
asters have a calamitous impact on firms’ available
sources of credit because they damage firms’ eco-
nomic prospects and the value of tangible assets
that could be used as collateral. In turn, lower col-
lateral may clog funding from mainstream lenders
and exacerbate firm financial distress. Hence, we
investigate whether alternative finance (such as pri-
vate equity, crowdfunding and venture capital) is
a viable and available source of funds for a large
sample of US firms affected by natural disasters
during the last decade.
We provide strong empirical evidence (using
data both at the firm and state level) that within
3 months after the occurrence of a natural disas-
ter, the amount of funds raised by non-traditional
lenders increases for firms in state(s) affected by
the event. We find that financing through alterna-
tive sources increases for large-sized firms, non-
IT firms and start-up firms. The amount raised
through debt financing is also larger, whereas
early-stage financing is negatively affected when
experiencing a hazardous event.
Our results have important implications for pol-
icymakers.When an exogenous catastrophic shock
hits the economy, physical assets are damaged,
firm capability to pledge collateral (required in tra-
ditional lending) is weakened, and thus firms may
find it difficult to raise financial resources for the
reconstruction. Our paper shows that alternative
sources of funding become particularly prominent
for firms after extreme natural events, and that
firm heterogeneity is essential to detect which firms
are more negatively affected by these hazardous
events. Smaller, less well-known and more opaque
firms are at a relative disadvantage and could see a
drop in the amount of funds raised through alter-
native sources.
Our findings may inform the design of finan-
cial policies in reaction to economic uncertainty.
The heterogeneity of the outcomes shown in our
paper plays an essential role from a policy per-
spective when deciding whether to support firms
in areas hit by a natural disaster. Targeted inter-
ventions may aim to support short-term financial
needs through, for example, grants, subsidies or
loan guarantees. Furthermore, enlisting the help
of the private sector through, for instance, collab-
orative partnerships (Xing, Liu and Cooper, 2018)
may entail a more transparent allocation of re-
sources, ensuring that financing reaches the most
affected enterprises efficiently.
Our study presents some limitations that are
useful starting points for future research. First,
we do not investigate the financial management
dynamics of firms affected by natural disasters.9
In this regard, one may assume that large-sized
firms take alternative sources of financing to meet
their short-term cash flow needs, and that this
funding could be a small proportion of their
total debt/long-term/short-term debt. However,
the availability, usage and impact of alternative
sources of financing may be relatively more sig-
nificant for small and medium-sized enterprises
because of their capital needs in hard times. Fu-
ture research may build a new dataset by matching
alternative finance deals and firm data (as asset,
9We would like to thank one of the referees for this con-
structive comment and for providing suggestions for fu-
ture research.
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liability, cost and income items) that will allow re-
searchers to develop an identification strategy free
of endogeneity concerns. Similarly, new data could
be collected to assess the overall negative impact of
extreme weather events, for example, in terms of
business failure, overall financing of affected firms
and/or resource losses. Moreover, unattended de-
mand for financing could be captured by gathering
information on rejected requests for funding. Fi-
nally, future work could incorporate in the analy-
sis essential features such as the presence of nonlo-
cal investors and their role in mitigating the effects
of localized disasters, the role of different types
of lenders, deals and learnings from past disasters,
and differentiate the impact by type of natural dis-
aster (climatological, hydrological, meteorological
and geophysical).
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